VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism

Results: 65



#Item
51Comput Econ DOIs10614The Duo-Item Bisection Auction Albin Erlanson

Comput Econ DOIs10614The Duo-Item Bisection Auction Albin Erlanson

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Source URL: erlanson.weebly.com

Language: English - Date: 2016-05-25 09:51:53
52Dynamic Allocation and Pricing : A Mechanism Design Approach Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu December 5,

Dynamic Allocation and Pricing : A Mechanism Design Approach Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu December 5,

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Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:05
53Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms? Tim Roughgarden??1 and Mukund Sundararajan? ? ?1 Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305.

Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms? Tim Roughgarden??1 and Mukund Sundararajan? ? ?1 Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305.

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2007-04-09 01:40:43
54CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #6: Gross Substitutes: Welfare Maximization in Polynomial Time∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 22, 2014

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #6: Gross Substitutes: Welfare Maximization in Polynomial Time∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 22, 2014

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-04 12:04:28
55Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding Kshipra Bhawalkar∗ Tim Roughgarden†  September 2, 2011

Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding Kshipra Bhawalkar∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 2, 2011

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-02-18 00:03:03
56CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #5: The Gross Substitutes Condition∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 22,

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #5: The Gross Substitutes Condition∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 22,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-04 12:01:46
57The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions PAUL DÜTTING, Stanford University VASILIS GKATZELIS, Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University  Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-

The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions PAUL DÜTTING, Stanford University VASILIS GKATZELIS, Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-01 04:11:34
58CS364B: Exercise Set #1 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, January 15, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions if pos

CS364B: Exercise Set #1 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, January 15, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions if pos

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-08 16:42:50
59CPSCECON, Fall 2011 Solution Set for Exam 1 Some of these answers are considerably longer and more detailed than answers needed to be to earn full credit. The additional information is provided so tha

CPSCECON, Fall 2011 Solution Set for Exam 1 Some of these answers are considerably longer and more detailed than answers needed to be to earn full credit. The additional information is provided so tha

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Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-10-19 23:17:02